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NET (RACE) NEUTRAL: AN ESSAY ON HOW 
GPA + (REWEIGHTED) SAT – RACE = DIVERSITY 
CHRIS CHAMBERS GOODMAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, Fisher v. University of Texas presented a significant challenge to 
Grutter v. Bollinger, the 2003 U.S. Supreme Court case that upheld diversity 
as a compelling interest that would justify narrowly tailored race-conscious 
consideration in the higher education admissions process. While the Fisher 
Court did not revisit the holding of Grutter, it remanded the case back to the 
circuit court to determine whether the University of Texas program met 
Grutter’s mandate of a narrowly tailored use of race, or violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because race-neutral alternative measures existed.1 
As the circuit court considered the issue,2 having conducted oral arguments 
in fall 2013, this Essay provides some brief thoughts on a race-neutral 
alternative that may accomplish the goal of enhanced racial and ethnic 
diversity in the admissions process, thereby rendering the University of Texas 
admissions program unconstitutional. We have just passed the eleventh 
anniversary of Grutter, and attempts to accomplish Grutter’s goal of diversity 
in elite, and even mediocre, institutions of higher education will be thwarted in 
the absence of affirmative action.3 While only a handful of states have 
 
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, A.B. Harvard College cum laude, J.D. 
Stanford Law School. The author wishes to thank recent graduate Eliana Ramirez for her 
outstanding work researching and drafting footnotes, as well as Senior Librarian Don Buffaloe for 
his always helpful reference work. 
 1. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013). 
 2. The Fifth Circuit issued its decision as this Article was being edited for publication. The 
circuit court upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment finding that the University of 
Texas program was sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny with less deference 
given to the University. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 758 F.3d 633, 636 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 3. Chris Chambers Goodman, A Modest Proposal in Deference to Diversity, 23 NAT’L 
BLACK L.J. 1, 19 (2010) (“The consensus among academics who support the goal of increasing 
diversity in classrooms seems to be that race-conscious affirmative action is needed to achieve 
diversity.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, After Affirmative Action, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1043 (1998) 
(arguing that affirmative action is needed for diversity in elite and mediocre institutions of higher 
education): 
If elite colleges and professional schools lack any significant number of minority students, 
they revive the dangerous symbolism of an entrenched, racially-defined underclass. On 
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outlawed affirmative action and the Court narrowly supports it,4 successful 
strikes against race conscious affirmative action may be on the horizon, and 
race neutral measures that enhance diversity can be beneficial to students of all 
colors. 
I.  WHAT THE UNITED STATE SUPREME COURT PERMITS AND SOME STATES 
PROHIBIT: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND FUNDING DISPARITIES BASED ON 
WEALTH 
The Supreme Court’s public education jurisprudence has evolved in the 
sixty years since Brown v. Board of Education; the Court specifically 
denounced de jure segregation, holding that when the government separates 
students by race in public education, that state action violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Constitution.5 In the aftermath of Brown, as 
integration efforts stalled, the Court addressed de facto education segregation, 
finding in Missouri v. Jenkins that de facto education segregation does not 
violate the Constitution once the school district has complied with the mandate 
of Brown and subsequent court orders to desegregate as much as practicable.6 
By returning control of schools and districts that achieved “unitary status” to 
state and local governments, rather than continuing jurisdiction in the federal 
courts, some say the doors re-opened to resegregation as long as it was in fact, 
rather than by law.7 
 
the other hand, the erosion or destruction of traditional indicia of merit [which would 
happen if we employ other substitutes for affirmative action that only lower the 
admissions standards of the institutions] risks undermining the privileged status of the 
university itself and the willingness of political bodies to support it. 
If this political prediction is correct, then continued pressure to eliminate race-
based preferences in higher education admissions is likely, in the near term, to produce a 
variety of efforts [that are] deliberate attempts to achieve the end of racial diversity 
indirectly through apparently race-neutral means. 
Id. at 1043–44. See also Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School 
Admissions Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (“[A]ffirmative action policies are likely a 
necessary prerequisite to maintaining a diverse yet capable law school student body.”). 
 4. William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River: Proposition 209 and Lessons for the Fisher 
Case, 39 J.C. & U.L. 53, 73 n.43, 88–89 (2013). The insertion of the “25 years” clause in Grutter 
to abandon race-based admissions policies is indicative that the Supreme Court supports the ban 
of affirmative action in at least a small way. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 310 (2003). 
 5. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Subsequently, the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 helped to end de jure segregation in public schools. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 
No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 6. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100–01 (1995). 
 7. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public 
Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1615 (2002). 
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On the school funding issue, the Court held in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez that an equal education was not a fundamental 
right under the Constitution and that wealth is not a protected class deserving 
of heightened scrutiny when state and local laws provided less funding to the 
school districts with higher concentrations of poverty.8 The Rodriguez Court 
did not address the issue of whether there is a fundamental right to education at 
all.9 Nonetheless, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court determined that denying free 
public education to undocumented children in Texas was a constitutional 
violation, despite reasoning that education was not a fundamental right, and 
that undocumented children were not a suspect class, despite applying 
intermediate scrutiny.10 Thus, under current law, no federal constitutional 
challenge will stand on the issue of funding disparities in public education 
within a state. 
While the Court in Grutter declared diversity in higher education to be a 
compelling interest justifying narrowly tailored race-based distinctions,11 this 
compelling interest requires periodic assessments of what is necessary to 
accomplish the goal of diversifying higher educational institutions and how 
well-tailored are the means used to reach the goal.12 The Court has found that 
 
 8. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54–55 (1973). 
 9. Id. at 35 (concluding that equal education does not qualify as a fundamental interest 
because it “is not among the rights afforded explicit protection” under the federal Constitution). 
There, the Court rejected wealth as a suspect class because of the vague definitions of poor and 
the deprivation of education. Id. at 19. Once the Court decided that no suspect class existed and 
equal education was not a fundamental right, it concluded that the level of scrutiny for state 
statutes challenging the Equal Protection Clause was only the rational basis test. Id. at 103–04. 
 10. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982). 
 11. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328, 343 (2003) (“Today, we hold that the Law 
School has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body. . . . [T]he Equal Protection 
Clause does not prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions 
to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse 
student body.”). Justice O’Connor found that the enrollment of a critical mass of 
underrepresented minority students at a Law School is a compelling interest because it 
“‘promotes cross-racial understanding,’ helps to break down racial stereotypes, and ‘enables 
[students] to better understand persons of different races.’” Id. at 330 (citation omitted). The 
Court explained that “[t]o be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program must not 
‘unduly burden individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups.’” Id. at 
341 (citation omitted). The Court declared that it was satisfied by the Law School’s admissions 
program because it considered “race as one factor among many[] in an effort to assemble a 
student body that is diverse in ways broader than race.” Id. at 340. 
 12. See id. at 342 (indicating that race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time 
in order to assure all citizens that the temporary rational preference is not permanent so as not to 
offend the equal protection principle). The Court held that this durational requirement can be met 
by sunset provisions and periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still 
necessary for student body diversity. Id. 
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affirmative action is necessary in some situations, and if practiced properly, a 
lower court will apply Grutter to uphold the program.13 
Native-born students of Hispanic and African heritage have significantly 
lower chances of being admitted to the flagship public institutions in California 
without affirmative action, as well as in Michigan, and perhaps in Texas, the 
battleground for the latest Supreme Court challenger, Abigail Fisher.14 In the 
law school context, for instance, minority enrollments continue to lag behind 
their percentages in the population.15 Students of color, overall, have accounted 
for about 20% of law school enrollments on average over the past decade, and 
by some reports are up to 25% in 2010–11.16 
 
 13. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 237 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding that 
through the University’s admissions program, individuals from underrepresented minorities 
would add unique perspectives that are otherwise absent from its classrooms and ensure that 
graduates learn to work with members of racial groups in the workforce, especially in a very 
diverse state like Texas). 
 14. See Goodman, supra note 3, at 19 (“Access is continued by maintaining affirmative 
action programs. This continued access will increase the legitimacy of those who are admitted 
through the door—as those admitted subsequently rise to the leadership positions of our 
governments, courts and businesses.”); Wightman, supra note 3, at 2 (finding in a study that 
“affirmative action policies are likely a necessary prerequisite to maintaining a diverse yet 
capable law school student body”). 
 15. See EMBRACING THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR INCREASING DIVERSITY INTO THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION: COLLABORATING TO EXPAND THE PIPELINE 15 (2005), available at http://www.a 
mericanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/diversity/pipelinepostreport.authcheck 
dam.pdf [hereinafter PIPELINE REPORT] (demonstrating the 2005 disproportionate application rate 
to ABA-accredited law schools by ethnicity: white students composed more than 65% of all 
applications, while African Americans were only 10.4%, Asians 8.3%, and Hispanic groups were 
8.2%). There is attrition at every stage of the timeline from entering students to working in the 
profession. In 2004, students of color graduating from law school secured 19.7% of the law jobs 
nationwide. Id. In 2005, African Americans were 12.1% of the national population, and received 
6.8% of law degrees conferred that year. Id. In 2005, Hispanics and Latinos were 12.5% of the 
national population, and received only 6.9% of law degrees conferred that year. Id. In 2005, 
Native American enrollment in law school was less than 400 students nationwide. In 2010, they 
were 1.3% of the matriculants. Id. See also Applicants by Ethnic and Gender Group, LAW SCH. 
ADMISSION COUNCIL, http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/ethnic-gender-applicants/archive 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2015) (reporting the percentages of white and minority student enrollments in 
law schools). 
 16. See PIPELINE REPORT, supra note 15 (“In the past decade, law school enrollment for 
students of color has remained around 19[%]–21% of all law school applicants”). For actual 
statistics, see End of Year Summary: ABA Applicants, Applications, Admissions, Enrollments, 
LSATS, CAS, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/lsac-
volume-summary (last visited Jan. 5, 2015); Applicants by Ethnic and Gender Group, supra note 
15 (Applicants in total ranged from 87,500 in 2010, down to 78,800 in 2011, and 67,700 in 2012, 
and the percentage in change of ethnicity from the prior year was negative 10.7% in 2011 and 
was negative 13.5% in 2012). See also Matriculants by Ethnicity and Gender Group, LAW SCH. 
ADMISSION COUNCIL, http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/ethnic-gender-matriculants (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2015). From 2010–2012 Asians and African Americans accounted for about 9% of 
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Tracing the root of these statistical disparities leads back to public 
schooling and its demise in California since Proposition 13,17 and nationwide 
since Rodriguez declined to find a fundamental right to equal educational 
funding and held that “economic” disparities in public education do not violate 
the Constitution.18 Rodriguez’s legacy is that students from middle and upper 
socioeconomic classes move to the better public schools (often in the suburbs) 
or choose private school.19 However, in many urban school districts, students 
are largely Latino or African American.20 De facto education segregation in 
primary and secondary schools remains permissible since Missouri v. 
Jenkins.21 This de facto segregation leads to varying quality of education based 
on variations in wealth, which are closely correlated to variations in race and 
ethnicity. 
 
the matriculants and Hispanics accounted for about 8.4%, while whites made up between 65%–
69%. Id. Please note that due to significant changes in data collection methods, race/ethnicity data 
collected by the Law School Admissions Council after 2009 are not directly comparable to prior 
data. Id. See also Women and Minorities in Law Firms – By Race and Ethnicity, NAT’L ASS’N 
FOR LAW PLACEMENT (Jan. 2012), http://www.nalp.org/ (search “Women and Minorities in Law 
Firms”; then follow “Show Bulletin Articles” hyperlink) (discussing the small representation of 
minority lawyers at law firms). 
 17. For the actual text of Proposition 13, see CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, and for a brief 
overview of its impact on school spending in California, see Proposition 13, EDUC. DATA P’SHIP, 
http://www.ed-data.k12.ca.us/pages/proposition13.aspx (last updated Apr. 1, 2012). 
 18. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35, 54–55 (1973) 
(concluding that education does not qualify as a fundamental interest because it is “not among the 
rights afforded explicit protection” under the federal constitution, and “to the extent that the 
[school financing system] results in unequal expenditures between children who happen to reside 
in different districts,” disagreeing that “such [economic] disparities are the product of a system 
that is so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory.”). 
 19. See Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 
1397–98 (1994) (noting a tendency for communities to sort themselves on basis of socioeconomic 
status); Laurie Reynolds, Uniformity of Taxation and the Preservation of Local Control in School 
Finance Reform, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1835, 1839–40 (2007) (noting that the current 
discrepancies between rich and poor school districts occurred post-World War II era when many 
middle and upper class Americans left cities to settle in prosperous homogenous suburbs and that 
this discrepancy was aggravated with the use of the local property tax for school funding); Aaron 
J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 504–05 (2010) (noting that 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent opinions from Rodriguez, such as Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
U.S. 717 (1974), and its progeny, incentivized white flight). 
 20. During the 2011–12 school year, the enrollment by ethnic groups in the Los Angeles 
Unified School District (“LAUSD”) included: 72.3% Hispanic, 9.6% African American, 10.1% 
White American, 4% Asian American, and 3.1% other. Enrollment by Ethnicity for 2011–12, 
CAL. DEP’T EDUC. (Sept. 26, 2012), http://dq.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/Enrollment/EthnicEnr.aspx?c 
Choice=DistEnrEth&cYear=2011-12&cSelect=+1932276—CEA+LOS+ANGELES+CO&The 
County=%u. 
 21. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 50 (1990) (holding that imposing an increase in 
property taxes levied by school districts to insure funding for desegregation of district’s public 
schools violated principles of federal/state comity). 
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The most recent Supreme Court case on public education is Fisher, which 
presented the question of whether the race-conscious admissions policy at the 
University of Texas at Austin violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution.22 The Court’s analysis focused on whether that affirmative action 
program was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest, and thus satisfies 
the test of “strict scrutiny.”23 In Fisher, the Court upheld the strict scrutiny 
standard, while adding teeth (or bite) and subtracting university deference 
from the narrow tailoring requirement.24 The University of Texas at Austin 
tried a top ten percent plan (“top 10% plan” or “top 10% GPA plan”), which 
had some success,25 but since its impact was limited,26 admissions officers re-
injected race27 and ethnicity as a “factor of a factor of a factor of a factor”28 
after the Grutter decision permitted this option.29 
 
 22. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013). 
 23. See Chris Chambers Goodman, Beneath the Veil: Corollaries on Diversity and Critical 
Mass Scholarships from Rawls’ Original Position on Justice, 13 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & 
SOC. JUST. 287, 323 (2007) (noting that although the Supreme Court’s rationale to justify the 
need for affirmative action programs has expanded to include diversity, the narrowly tailored 
requirement of the strict scrutiny test remains an obstacle for many of these programs). 
 24. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420. The court held that while narrow tailoring does not require 
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative, “strict scrutiny does require a court to 
examine with care, and not defer to, a university’s ‘serious, good faith consideration of workable 
race-neutral alternatives.’” Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339–40 (2003)). 
 25. The top ten percent law plan was successful in some years at improving student diversity 
beyond pre-1996 levels, the year Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), struck down the 
university’s previous affirmative action policy. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345). In 1996, the enrolled freshman class was 18.6% African 
American and Hispanic. Id. at 3. In 2004, the freshman class was 21.4% African American and 
Hispanic. Id. at 5. But in 2002, only 17.6% of the entering freshman class was African American 
and Hispanic, below 1996 levels. Brief for Respondents at 10, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 
2411 (2013) (No. 11-345). 
 26. University officials did not believe the university’s demographics were representative of 
Texas’s, a minority-majority state that has experienced high population growth in its Hispanic 
population. Brief for Respondents, supra note 25. Despite up-and-down progress in diversity, 
90% of classes with ten to twenty-four students—a class size the university saw as conducive to 
class discussion—enrolled zero or only one African American and/or Hispanic student in 2002. 
Id. 
 27. Hours after the Grutter decision, the University of Texas at Austin announced it would 
begin to expressly consider race in applications. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 25, at 5. 
 28. The now famous phrase “factor of a factor of a factor of a factor” originated from U.S. 
District Judge Sam Sparks’ 2009 ruling in Fisher that granted summary judgment in the 
University of Texas at Austin’s favor. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 608–09 
(W.D. Tex. 2009) (explaining that race is one of seven special circumstances; special 
circumstances, is one of six factors in the personal achievement score, which is one of three 
factors in the Personal Achievement Index, which is one of two elements of a final score for 
admission). 
 29. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325, 334 (endorsing Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), that student body diversity is a 
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By remanding the case to the Circuit court to re-evaluate the University’s 
compliance with the narrow tailoring requirement—effectively requiring it to 
prove that there is no race-neutral means to accomplish diversity—the stage 
was set for a lower court determination that the University of Texas at Austin 
does not meet its burden to show that the top ten percent plan plus race as a 
“factor of a factor of a factor of a factor” is sufficiently narrowly tailored to 
satisfy this more rigorous version of strict scrutiny.30 The Fifth Circuit 
performed the analysis and determined that the evidence presented at the trial 
court level in support of the summary judgment motion was sufficient to 
satisfy the narrow tailoring component of the test.31 
II.  WHAT FISHER COULD MEAN 
A. The Fisher Factor: Narrow Tailoring with Teeth 
The Fisher majority avoided ending affirmative action before Justice 
O’Connor’s suggested 2028 timeline,32 although several justices would have 
supported such an outcome.33 The prevalence of 5–4 decisions in recent years, 
 
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions under strict 
scrutiny, and finding that the University of Michigan law school’s use of race in admissions is 
narrowly tailored to advance that interest because it is not a quota, rather, it only considers race as 
a “plus factor,” and uses race in a “flexible, nonmechanical way” to reach a “truly individualized 
consideration” of an application). 
 30. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. 
 31. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 758 F.3d 633, 657 (5th Cir. 2014) (“We are satisfied that UT 
Austin has demonstrated that race-conscious holistic review is necessary to make the Top Ten 
Percent Plan workable by patching the holes that a mechanical admissions program leaves in its 
ability to achieve the rich diversity that contributes to its academic mission—as described by 
Bakke and Grutter.”). 
 32. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 230–31, 246–47 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that the 
university’s admissions policy was supported by a compelling interest in achieving a critical mass 
of diversity, rather than outright racial balancing for its own sake; narrow tailoring did not require 
exhaustion of Texas Top Ten Percent Law as a constitutionally mandated alternative; and the 
university had not yet reached critical mass, which would render any race-based consideration 
unnecessary). 
 33. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2422–33 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). In a one-paragraph concurrence, Justice Scalia restated his view in Grutter that 
“[t]he Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided 
education is no exception.” Id. at 2422 (citations omitted). But because the petitioner did not ask 
the Court to overrule Grutter, Justice Scalia joined the Court’s opinion in full. Id. Justice Thomas, 
in an eleven-page concurring opinion, restated his view in Grutter that “only those measures the 
State must take to provide a bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent violence, will constitute a 
pressing public necessity sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny.” Id. at 2424 (citations omitted). 
Because there is nothing pressing or necessary about obtaining the benefits of diversity in higher 
education, Thomas would have overturned Grutter and invalidated the UT-Austin program. Id. 
Just as racial discrimination did not justify segregation under Brown, racial discrimination did not 
justify the “alleged” educational benefits of diversity. Id. 
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along with the Court’s new roster since Grutter, makes it likely that the Court 
will revisit affirmative action in higher education prior to 2028.34 
Although the Rehnquist Court already decided in Grutter that diversity in 
higher education is a compelling interest,35 the Roberts Court could have 
chosen to reconsider that precedent and revise the interpretation of whether 
racial and ethnic diversity is indeed a compelling interest. Some would say that 
it was fortunate that the Court did not reconsider diversity as a compelling 
interest, while others note that the decision deters affirmative action programs 
because of its recognition that benign and invidious racial discrimination are 
held to the same strict scrutiny standard. 
Given the Court’s desire to avoid overturning itself on such a big question 
less than a decade later, the decision simply revised its interpretation of what 
constitutes “narrow tailoring” and what does not.36 The Court’s mandate that 
this university receive less deference than was accorded to the law school in 
Grutter means that the trial court will require additional proof to establish 
whether there are other options for accomplishing the university’s diversity 
goal.37 Further constricting of the narrow tailoring components of strict 
scrutiny need not be fatal to the University of Texas at Austin program. Given 
the current state of public education, the only proven, successful way to 
increase diversity, some say, is with race-conscious measures, and the Fifth 
 
 34. See Goodman, supra note 3, at 4 (noting the Court’s latest roster change: Justice Alito 
replaced Justice O’Connor, Justice Roberts was appointed Chief, Justice Sotomayor was the latest 
appointment, and Justice Souter recently retired). “As the fifth vote in favor of upholding 
[Grutter’s] affirmative action program, the absence of Justice O’Connor could mean that the next 
diversity case that is presented to the Court could result in a far different decision—such as the 
overruling or curtailing of the holding in Grutter.” Id. 
 35. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 328–29 (2003). 
 36. See Goodman, supra note 23, at 337. 
The U.S. Supreme Court roster has changed in the three years since Grutter and Gratz, 
and therefore if a race-conscious financial aid program was granted certiorari, the Court 
might follow reasoning other than that explained in the majority opinions, on the grounds 
that stare decisis is not implicated because of the differences between admissions and 
financial aid issues. If the Court notes this distinction, then the argument that the 
scholarship aid is sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy the strict scrutiny test is a 
stronger one than in the admissions context. 
Id. See also Chris Chambers Goodman, Retaining Diversity in the Classroom: Strategies for 
Maximizing the Benefits That Flow from a Diverse Student Body, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 663, 667 
(2008) [hereinafter Goodman, Retaining Diversity] (“As with any narrowly tailored program, any 
use of race must be limited in extent and duration, so the courts will also examine whether less 
extensive or less intrusive means are available.”). 
 37. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (“[S]trict scrutiny imposes on the university the ultimate 
burden of demonstrating, before turning to racial classifications, that available, workable race-
neutral alternatives do not suffice.”). 
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Circuit found such measures to be necessary in this case on remand.38 Some 
scholars have found that socioeconomic status proxies do not produce any 
significant racial or ethnic diversity at the more elite educational levels,39 and 
the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that class, rather than race, should be 
the focus of affirmative action measures, stating that “[w]e are ill-equipped to 
sort out race, class, and socioeconomic structures,” or to conclude that “skin 
color is no longer an index of prejudice; that we would will it does not make it 
so.”40 Recognizing the inter-relationship between race, class, and 
socioeconomic status does not mean that simply separating out race and 
leaving the other two classifications intact will lead to an effective race-neutral 
alternative. 
B. A (Potentially) Adequate Race-Neutral Alternative 
On the other hand, the Fisher decision could have been (almost) fatal to 
affirmative action if what was narrowly tailored in Grutter is no longer so in 
the post-Fisher legal landscape. The Fifth Circuit declined to remand the case 
back to the trial court,41 which it could have done if it deemed necessary an 
evaluation of additional evidence since the case was decided on summary 
judgment rather than after trial. Nevertheless, other courts seeking to reduce 
the substantial deference to universities that the Grutter court has been accused 
of providing may perform a different analysis and find that adequate race- 
neutral alternatives do exist. 
 
 38. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 758 F.3d 633, 658 (5th Cir. 2014). See also Goodman, Retaining 
Diversity, supra note 36, at 685–88 (illustrating the benefits reaped from existing diversity 
education programs in higher education); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1046–48 (explaining the 
difference between race-neutral programs and affirmative action programs and how the latter is 
essential for increasing diversity); Wightman, supra note 3, at 50 (concluding in a study that there 
continues to be a need for affirmative action admissions policies in legal education to assure 
diversity in the student body). 
 39. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 23, at 326–30 (listing ineffective race-neutral factors in 
presumptively increasing diversity such as athletic abilities, socioeconomic status, fluency in a 
second language, and a reverse grandfather clause among others); Wightman, supra note 3, at 39–
40 (explaining how factors such as socioeconomic status, selectivity of undergraduate school and 
undergraduate major do not produce a highly qualified ethnically diverse student body like the 
consideration of race does). See also Goodman, Retaining Diversity, supra note 36, at 684 
(explaining why UCLA’s program that included socioeconomic status in its admissions policy 
failed to increase racial diversity); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1042–43 (using the Texas and UCLA 
Law School programs to demonstrate how racial proxies are less efficient for increasing 
diversity). 
 40. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 657. 
 41. Id. at 641 (“There is no clear benefit to remanding this case to the district court . . . . 
[because] there are no new issues of fact that need to be resolved, nor is there any identified need 
for additional discovery; that the record is sufficiently developed; and that the found error is 
common to both this Court and the district court. It follows that a remand would likely result in 
duplication of effort.”). 
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A brief explanation of the admission process reveals some potential 
options for other university admissions officers; if any of them are viable, then 
the use of race will fail under the Court’s articulated standard. When a 
university is considering academic merit, the applicant’s high school GPA 
determines whether he or she is in the top 10% GPAs of the various eligible 
high schools.42 For those not in the top 10%, a university uses the applicant’s 
SAT score and GPA to determine their academic index.43 Universities like UT-
Austin, for example, then evaluate personal factors, including race, to 
determine the applicant’s personal index. They then plot these two indices on a 
matrix, determining where to draw the diagonal line between admission and 
denial.44 
Because the top ten percent GPA plan produces some diversity, due to the 
substantial segregation in public schools in Texas,45 a similar percentage plan 
that uses SAT scores could be another race neutral way of increasing the 
diversity of students in the pool that is not part of the top 10% GPA. If the 
applicant’s high school SAT percentile were factored in, rather than the 
nationwide SAT percentile or the actual SAT numerical score, those from 
lower performing schools would not be penalized by lower scores on the SAT. 
Lower scores are to be expected based on the quality of high school, prior 
educational preparation, as well as parental education and income levels, 
school resources and availability of quality extracurricular activities, as well 
race and ethnicity.46 When considering those students, the university could 
 
 42. Id. at 638. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Brief for Respondents, supra note 25, at 12–15. 
 45. The Fifth Circuit noted on remand that the “sad truth is that the Top Ten Percent Plan 
gains diversity from a fundamental weakness in the Texas secondary education system. The de 
facto segregation of schools in Texas enables the Top Ten Percent Plan to increase minorities in 
the mix, while ignoring contributions to diversity beyond race.” Fisher, 758 F.3d at 649–51. 
Similar situations exist in other states with percentile plans. 
 46. A statistical analysis by the College Board, which produces the SAT, found that 
extracurricular activities had a stronger impact on SAT scores than socioeconomic background. 
HOWARD T. EVERSON & ROGER E. MILLSAP, BEYOND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES: EXPLORING 
SCHOOL EFFECTS ON SAT SCORES 8–9 (2004), available at http://research.collegeboard.org/sites/ 
default/files/publications/2012/7/researchreport-2004-3-exploring-school-effects-sat-scores.pdf. 
Even when controlling for differences in family income and parental education, African 
Americans and Hispanics score lower on standardized tests than whites. See WAYNE J. CAMARA 
& AMY ELIZABETH SCHMIDT, GROUP DIFFERENCES IN STANDARDIZED TESTING AND SOCIAL 
STRATIFICATION 8–13 (1999), available at http://research.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/2012/7/researchreport-1999-5-group-differences-standardized-testing-social-stratifi 
cation.pdf; Ezekiel J. Dixon-Román et al., Race, Poverty and SAT Scores: Modeling the 
Influences of Family Income on Black and White High School Students’ SAT Performance, 115 
TCHRS. COLL. REC., Apr. 2013, at 1, 3, available at http://www.tcrecord.org/content.asp?content 
id=16925; Herbert W. Marsh & Sabina Kleitman, Extracurricular School Activities: The Good, 
the Bad, and the Nonlinear, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 464, 464–65 (2002). 
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index the SAT scores based on the applicant’s percentile for those in their high 
school who took the SAT test. Thus, a person who scored at the 60% 
nationwide on the SAT might be in the top 10% of SAT takers in their 
particular high school, especially if their high school did not have a large 
number of well-prepared SAT test-takers. 
Following this approach would likely raise the applicants’ academic index 
scores, and combined with already favorable personal index scores, these 
applicants can be charted over the line into the “Admissible” category, 
potentially without the need to include their race as a personal index factor. 
What this approach would do is to capitalize, much as the top ten percent 
plans do, on the inequalities in public education within states, by not blaming 
the students, but rather providing a more equal opportunity for all public 
school students to prove themselves in a public institution of higher education 
that their tax dollars support.47 
SAT test scores are useful in predicting grades in college, and therefore the 
lower SAT scores relative to their peers suggests lower grades in college; 
however, more research will need to be done to determine whether high 
achieving students (for their high school) outperform their SAT nationwide 
percentiles.48 To the extent that top 10% grades at a low performing high 
school have been sufficient for those students to retain their academic standing 
at the university level, as for many they have been,49 a score in the top tenth 
SAT percentile may be sufficient to retain academic standing as well. 
Universities would need to research whether relatively high SAT performance 
for one’s high school could have a similar impact on the ability to achieve 
solid academic standing as having relatively high grades has had. 
C. Applying This Solution in States That Prohibit Affirmative Action 
Some jurisdictions no longer permit affirmative action in public 
institutions of higher learning regardless of narrowly tailoring and least 
restrictive alternatives, having abolished it by legislation or by popular vote, 
 
 47. The Texas top 10 percent law also applies to private school students attending schools 
that are accredited by the state. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803(a)(1) (West 2013). 
 48. PAUL R. SACKETT ET AL., SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE SAT AND FRESHMAN GPA: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM 41 COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 
6 (2009), available at http://research.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/publications/2012/9/re 
searchreport-2009-1-socioeconomic-status-sat-freshman-gpa-analysis-data.pdf; see Rebecca 
Zwick & Igor Himelfarb, The Effect of High School Socioeconomic Status on the Predictive 
Validity of SAT Scores and High School Grade-Point Average, 48 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT 101, 
101 (2011). 
 49. See Kidder, supra note 4, at 95. 
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like Proposition 209 in California,50 Proposition 2 in Michigan,51 and Initiative 
424 in Nebraska.52 While private schools in these states are still able to use 
affirmative action under the Grutter decision, public schools must refrain from 
granting any admissions preference to applicants based on race, ethnicity, or 
national origin (among other factors).53 In these states, race or ethnicity cannot 
even be a “factor of a factor of a factor.” 
The challenge remains for public institutions within the states that have 
outlawed affirmative action54 on several levels. First, most of those institutions 
have seen a pernicious drop in their domestic minority enrollments with the 
abolition of affirmative action.55 Some of these schools—particularly the more 
 
 50. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a) (“The State shall not discriminate against, or grant 
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or 
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.”). 
 51. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (“No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; 
nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated 
against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin.”). The 
convention record of this section notes that the main areas of concern are equal opportunities in 
employment, education, housing and public accommodations. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2, 
Convention Cmts. 
 52. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 30(1) (“The state shall not discriminate against, or grant 
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or 
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.”). 
 53. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319–20 (1978). The Court in Bakke 
elaborated on this principle, indicating that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act proscribes only those 
racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause if employed by a State or its 
agencies, not a private institution whose activities might not involve sufficient state or federal 
action. Id. at 328–29 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Goodman, 
supra note 23, at 288 (indicating that the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education 
has investigated public universities who continue to apply race conscious scholarship programs 
that are not race-neutral alternatives). 
 54. Other states that have outlawed affirmative action include: H. Con. Res. 2019 (Ariz. 
2010); Prop. 209 (Cal. 1996); Exec. Order 99-281 (Fla. 1999); Initiative 424 (Neb. 2008); H.B. 
623, 2011 Sess. (N.H. 2011); S.R. Res. 33, 54th Leg. 2d Sess. (Okla. 2012); H.B. 588 (Tex. 
1997); Initiative 200 (Wash. 1998). Affirmative Action: State Action, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEG. (Apr. 
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/affirmative-action-state-action.aspx. 
 55. See PIPELINE REPORT, supra note 15, at 14 (noting that in the states that ban affirmative 
action in public schools, “the admission rates of students of color in post-secondary educational 
institutions have plummeted.”); see also Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1041–42 (explaining that if 
race could no longer be used as a basis for preference in university admissions, then resegregation 
in public institutions would occur as private institutions who can still use race in admissions 
would be more attractive to minority applicants) (“[T]he basic scenario would be either that 
higher education in the aggregate, or elite and flagship institutions in particular, would suffer a 
considerable and publicly visible drop in black and Latino representation as compared with the 
current levels achieved under racially preferential admissions policies.”); Pamela Burdman, UC 
Breathes Sigh of Relief Over Minority Enrollment, S.F. CHRON., May 21, 1998, at A26 (reporting 
that in the first year of the Regents of the University of California system’s race-blind admissions 
policy, minority enrollments decreased at their most selective institutions). 
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elite—mitigated the depth of this drop-off by using international students to 
diversify their incoming classes.56 For many of the other schools that do not 
share an international reputation, increasing minority enrollments in the 
absence of affirmative action would require lowering admission standards 
across the board.57 Research studies demonstrate that the average SAT and 
ACT scores of Latino, Hispanic, and African American students are notably 
below those of Anglos and Asian Americans.58 
The second level of the challenge is that most universities are unlikely to 
reduce their academic standards given the increasingly competitive 
environment in university admissions.59 While the efficacy of standardized test 
scores in the college admissions process is the subject of another debate,60 even 
an increased reliance upon grade point averages could amount to a lowering of 
academic standards.61 It is true that grade point averages are not as racially 
 
 56. Goodman, supra note 23, at 331 (indicating that some elite educational institutions use 
international students to increase diversity as another race-neutral route). 
 57. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1042–43. If such policies are banned, universities will seek to 
achieve diversity in some other way, including abandoning the traditional criteria for selection, 
like grades and standardized test scores. Id. This will occur because the black and Hispanic 
acceptance rates in higher education are clustered in the low end of the score and grade 
distributions. Applicants by Ethnic and Gender Group, supra note 15, at 18. Thus, higher 
education institutions may decrease the weight given to GPAs and standardized test scores and 
ultimately lower the admission standards in order to achieve diversity independent of affirmative 
action policies. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1043. 
 58. See William G. Bowen, Grutter: Where Do We Go from Here?: The Impact of the 
Supreme Court Decisions in the University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases, 44 J. BLACKS 
HIGHER EDUC. 76, 79 (2004) (reporting that underrepresented minorities perform significantly 
less well on test scores of college preparation than do whites and Asians). See also PIPELINE 
REPORT, supra note 15, at 15 (noting that the Law School Admission Test and the bar exam 
passage rate for students of color are generally lower than whites); Kidder, supra note 4, at 91, 
95. 
 59. See, e.g., John Bound et al., Playing the Admissions Game: Student Reactions to 
Increasing College Competition, J. ECON PERSPECTIVES, Fall 2009, at 119 (noting the increasing 
competition to gain entry into American four-year colleges or universities in the last thirty to 
forty years). 
 60. See Goodman, supra note 23, at 316 (pointing to evidence that the SAT has a racial bias 
because it scores each item equally, which, since white students tend to do better on easy items 
while African Americans do so on hard items, negatively affects the scores of non-white 
students); Goodman, supra note 36, at 682 (noting that applicants with average LSAT scores can 
still become good lawyers) (“[S]tudents of any color with lower LSAT scores than the current 
competitive range for top schools are not necessarily, by virtue of their score, unqualified to 
attend those law schools, and can succeed, as earlier lawyers did, in spite of their LSAT scores.”); 
Wightman, supra note 3, at 29 (discussing that the LSAT is valid for a limited use, to see the 
acquired reading and verbal reasoning skills that have been correlated with academic successes in 
the first year of law school, but using it for a broader purpose “damages its validity”). 
 61. See Wightman, supra note 3, at 34 (presenting evidence that overreliance on the 
university GPA when law schools make admissions decisions will lead to predictable and 
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skewed, but the great disparities in the quality of public secondary education 
across the nation often have a larger negative impact on the level of 
preparedness of students from these underrepresented racial groups, despite 
their high grades.62 Unless the rigor of the specific secondary school 
curriculum is taken into account, it would be difficult to ensure that high grade 
point averages coincide with sufficiently rigorous secondary school 
preparation to lead to successful college placement and performance.63 
This leads to the third challenge—that when the rigor of the secondary 
school is assessed in the college admissions process, those who attend public 
high schools, especially in urban areas, are likely to have the level of rigor 
inversely proportional to the percentage of underrepresented minority students 
in that school.64 Studies in several states support this assessment that public 
secondary schools with higher minority populations often perform at lower 
levels on standardized measures.65 In fact, the only way to create a class with 
equal SAT score averages between African Americans and Anglos is to 
“discriminate against blacks.”66 Thus, even those students with high grade 
point averages may not be as ready as their peers with similar grade point 
averages from other public secondary schools.67 
 
systematic exclusion of a large number of minority applicants from legal education when a large 
proportion of those applicants are qualified to undertake the rigor of a legal education). 
 62. See, e.g., Linda Darling-Hammond, The Color Line in American Education: Race, 
Resources, and Student Achievement, 1 DU BOIS REV. 213 (outlining current disparities in 
educational access and illustrating the relationships between race, educational resources, and 
student achievement). See Bowen, supra note 58, at 79 (reporting that underrepresented 
minorities do significantly less well on traditional measures for college preparation than do 
whites and Asians); Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 103 (1995) (noting that the quality of the educational 
opportunities offered in the public schools of most American urban centers is “shockingly poor”); 
Roey Ahram et al., Framing Urban School Challenges: The Problems to Examine When 
Implementing Response to Intervention, RTI ACTION NETWORKS, http://www.rtinetwork.org/ 
learn/diversity/urban-school-challenges (last visited Jan. 5, 2015) (indicating that urban school 
districts across America have the most underrepresented racial groups). 
 63. See SARAH E. REDFIELD, DIVERSITY REALIZED: PUTTING THE WALK WITH THE TALK 
FOR DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 85 (2009). See also MICHAEL J. PUMA ET AL., 
PROSPECTS: FINAL REPORT ON STUDENT OUTCOMES, at v (1997), available at http://files.eric. 
ed.gov/fulltext/ED413411.pdf (“[W]hen measured against standardized test scores, a grade of ‘A’ 
in a high-poverty school is equivalent to a grade of about ‘C’ in a low-poverty school.”). 
 64. See PUMA ET AL., supra note 63, at 26, 58. 
 65. Id. at 58. 
 66. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 16 (1998). 
See also Kidder, supra note 4, at 99. 
 67. Charles Dervarics, Study: Minority, Low-Income Students Lack Adequate Access to 
Educational Opportunities, DIVERSE (Aug. 8, 2011), http://diverseeducation.com/article/16180/#. 
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In order to compensate for the lower levels of diverse student admissions 
based primarily on SAT scores, schools that increase reliance on grade point 
averages will in effect be admitting students who are less well prepared than 
those that they currently admit.68 A more diverse class will also be a less 
prepared class in most cases because of the differences in rigor in their high 
school educations.69 However, one University of Texas study refutes this 
notion, finding that the top ten percent students from lower-performing schools 
outperformed their GPA expectations.70 If the rigor of the high school 
educations for applicants is equalized, then under the current system the class 
will be less diverse (again, in the absence of international students).71 
For those colleges and universities at the upper tiers of the education 
hierarchy, these admissions decisions are a crucial aspect of self-preservation. 
Elite institutions cannot maintain their elite status in this global environment 
without racial and ethnic diversity, hence the move to include international 
students in their entering classes.72 The backlash over affirmative action has 
helped to increase the representation of diverse students from other nations, 
often at the cost or expense (literally given that they generally do not qualify 
for financial aid) of matriculation by students of color who were born in the 
United States.73 
 
 68. Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation, Academic 
Excellence, and Future Leadership, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1767, 1820 (2004). 
 69. See REDFIELD, supra note 63, at 51 (showing that underrepresented minorities have 
higher attrition rates in law school and lower bar passage rates); Patte Barth, The Importance of 
High School Rigor, AM. SCH. BOARD J., Nov. 2012, at 20–21, available at http://riverside.school. 
boiseschools.org/modules/groups/homepagefiles/cms/3238147/File/Curriculum%20Information/
The%20Importance%20of%20HS%20Rigor%20ASBJ%2011-12.pdf; Are High Schools Failing 
Their Students?: Strengthening Academic Rigor in High School Curriculum, CTR. FOR 
COMPREHENSIVE SCH. REFORM & IMPROVEMENT (Oct. 2006), http://www.centerforcsri.org/in 
dex.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=386&Itemid=5. 
 70. Marta Tienda & Sunny Xinchun Niu, Flagships, Feeders, and the Texas Top 10% Law: 
A Test of the “Brain Drain” Hypothesis, 77 J. HIGHER EDUC. 712, 732 (2006). 
 71. See Mark E. Engberg & Gregory C. Wolniak, Examining the Effects of High School 
Contexts on Postsecondary Enrollment, 51 J. ASS’N INST. RES. 132, 140, 146–48 (2010). 
 72. Goodman, supra note 23, at 331 (noting that some of the diversity in elite institutions 
comes from international students of color); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1043 (arguing that the 
prospect of returning to zero diversity is “daunting” in higher education, and concluding that a 
crucial aspect of self-preservation for universities requires diversity). 
 73. CHRISTINE M. MATHEWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. 97-746, FOREIGN SCIENCE 
AND ENGINEERING PRESENCE IN U.S. INSTITUTIONS AND THE LABOR FORCE 9–10 (2010) 
(explaining a cost of foreign students in graduate programs has been a subsidy out of U.S. 
taxpayer funds of foreign doctoral students over all American minority students); Goodman, 
supra note 23, at 331 (indicating that some elite higher education schools have been able to 
mitigate the drop of minority enrollments by using international students). However: 
[d]iversity-based programs may create a false impression that past discrimination is being 
addressed by benefitting blacks who are not victims of past societal discrimination, such 
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Since elite institutions are already perceived as very elite, an increasing 
international rather than domestic enrollment will exacerbate this perception.74 
For those elite institutions that are also public, such a perception will 
increasingly undermine public (taxpayer) support of the institution.75 Imagine 
if no California students were admitted to UCLA or University of California, 
Berkeley one year.76 What would be the justification for continued taxpayer 
and government support for the institutions if they no longer served California 
resident students? They would employ Californians, of course, and through 
law and medical schools would serve California residents, but there are much 
cheaper ways to get such services without financing an elite educational 
institution or system. In high tax rate states like California and New York, 
citizens would be reluctant to support additional tax increases that would be 
necessary to secure additional state funding. 
Similarly, imagine if no local students, of any color, could gain admission 
to UCLA or UC Berkeley. While not as troublesome as no Californians 
perhaps, admissions decisions with that result likely would have dire 
consequences and lead to legislative oversight or a proposition on the ballot in 
the next election cycle (given California’s propensity for such things).77 Is it 
much different if students of Hispanic and African heritage are effectively shut 
out unless they hail from a country other than this one? 
CONCLUSION 
While there will be some additional challenges in terms of academic 
preparedness, a top ten percent SAT plan provides a way to equalize 
educational opportunity and diversify even more, without explicitly using race 
as a factor of a factor at all. Some may say this proposed Texas top ten percent 
SAT/GPA compromise gives up too much ground, given that there is likely to 
be overlap between the top SAT takers and top GPA students at 
underperforming schools, thus barely increasing the diversity of the eligible or 
qualified applicant pool.78 Others may protest that lower grades combined with 
 
as recent black immigrants. Such programs may thus close the black-white gap with the 
wrong blacks, that is, with blacks who were not harmed by past societal discrimination. 
Id. at 331. 
 74. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1043. See also Goodman, supra note 23, at 331. 
 75. See MATHEWS, supra note 73, at 9–10 (explaining the U.S. taxpayer cost of funding 
foreign students over American minority students in graduate programs). 
 76. See Kidder, supra note 4, at 74–80, 88–89, 103. 
 77. As of 2010, California voters had approved 80 ballot initiatives. Kevin O’Leary, How 
the Initiative Culture Broke California, TIME (Feb. 26, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/na 
tion/article/0,8599,1968141-2,00.html. 
 78. Vinay Harpalani, Diversity Within Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of Race-
Conscious Admissions, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 463, 505–07, 512 (2012); Mark C. Long & Marta 
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a relatively low SAT score, regardless of high school percentile, may 
undermine academic standards too significantly by admitting students with 
decreased potential for academic success,79 though at least one study thus far 
provides contrary evidence of student successes. Taxpayers may be concerned 
when their high-achieving children are repeatedly declined admission to their 
state-funded institutions under such a plan because their relative SAT scores 
for their school will be too low for admission. All of these concerns may be the 
impetus needed to launch greater efforts to find assessments that result in a net 
diversity increase. The recent move to revise the SAT and reduce reliance on it 
for college admissions may become a positive step towards increasing 
diversity in higher education. 
  
 
Tienda, Changes in Texas Universities’ Applicant Pools After the Hopwood Decision, 39 SOC. 
SCI. RES. 48, 63 (2010). 
 79. Laycock, supra note 68, at 1820. 
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